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Abstract 
 
Spectrum sharing mechanisms have evolved to meet different needs related to increasing 
spectrum use efficiency. At first, decentralized and opportunistic cognitive radios (and cognitive 
radio networks) were the primary focus of research for these mechanisms. This gradually 
transitioned towards the development of cooperative sharing methods based on databases, 
typified by TV White Spaces databases. Spectrum sharing is now the basis for the dynamic and 
fine-grained spectrum rights regime for the Citizen’s Band Radio Service (CBRS) as well as for 
License Shared Access (LSA). 
The emergence of the cryptocurrency Bitcoin has stimulated interest in applying its underlying 
technology, blockchain, to other applications as well, such as securities trading and supply chain 
management.  This paper explores the application of blockchain to radio spectrum 
management.  While blockchains could underlie radio spectrum management more broadly, we 
will focus on dynamic spectrum sharing applications.  Like the cooperative approaches currently 
in use, blockchain is a database technology. However, a blockchain is a decentralized database 
in which the owner of the data maintains control. We consider the benefits and limitations of 
blockchain solutions in general, and then examine their potential application to four major 
categories of spectrum sharing. The use of blockchain technology in spectrum management 
could have significant implications for stakeholders. 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Blockchain has been heralded as a technology that could be as important as the Internet [2].  
Secure distributed ledgers and cryptocurrencies based on blockchain technologies could have 
many applications and be broadly disruptive. This paper examines one potential use case, 
exploring the ways this technology might be applied to spectrum sharing.1   
 
                                                             
1 While in this paper we focus on blockchain as it applies to spectrum sharing, there may be situations where 
blockchain could be applied to non-sharing-based approaches, such as its use in spectrum license databases or 
possibly as part of a spectrum usage application.  
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This paper is structured as follows. Section II provides an introduction to the concepts of 
distributed ledgers based on blockchain technology. Section III provides a general description of 
how distributed ledgers could impact spectrum sharing. Section IV describes how distributed 
ledgers for spectrum management could be implemented in different spectrum access 
scenarios, and discusses the pros and cons of using blockchain in each scenario. Section V 
discusses the implications for various stakeholder groups of blockchain-based distributed 
ledgers in spectrum management. Section VI presents our conclusions and recommendations 
for future work. 
  
II. DISTRIBUTED LEDGER TECHNOLOGY 
Technically, blockchain technology implements a distributed ledger: A secure decentralized 
form of a database where no single party has control [36]. It offers a resilient, reliable, 
transparent and decentralized way of recording and manipulating data across all the nodes of a 
network of interested parties that want to keep the distributed ledger up to date. Blockchain is 
best known as the basis of Bitcoin, a private digital “cryptocurrency” that can function as 
money despite not being issued by any government [23]. However, distributed ledgers have 
many more uses. There are now other services operating on the Bitcoin blockchain, 
independent blockchains with their own cryptocurrencies (such as the Ethereum and Ripple), 
and distributed ledgers with no native currency.  
The transactions stored on a distributed ledger could represent anything: holdings of a digital 
currency (as with Bitcoin), the movement of goods across a global supply chain, syndicated 
loans among financial institutions, or land title records, to name just a few applications under 
development. Just as relational databases accessed through client-server computing were the 
foundation for the business revolution built around the World Wide Web, blockchain, as a 
distributed ledger, is a foundational technology that could have far-reaching impacts [17]. 
The distinctive feature of blockchain distributed ledgers is that each node connected to the 
blockchain network can maintain its own copy of the distributed ledger and control over its 
own data, yet everyone sees the same ledger. There is no need for a master copy or 
clearinghouse. This property, known as consensus, may be achieved through several technical 
mechanisms, which are discussed in more detail in Appendix A. The advantages of a consensus-
based system depend on the particular application, but they may include: resistance to 
censorship or tampering, avoidance of the need to trust a central government or private 
institution, elimination of inefficiencies and errors in reconciling transactions across a network, 
and an immutable transaction record.  
 
Once information is stored on a blockchain, it can be acted upon through “smart contracts” [8]. 
Smart contracts are special-purpose code that can execute instructions on a blockchain [36]. 
They can execute contractual logic, such as paying beneficiaries according to the terms of a will, 
or granting rights to start a car if the lease is paid up. Bitcoin uses a very simple set of smart 
contract functions limited for security reasons to moving currency tokens between accounts. 
Other systems go farther. Smart contracts mean that virtually any activity that can be 
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represented in software could, in theory, be implemented in an automated and distributed 
form on a blockchain. This idea was proposed by Szabo in the 1990s [32], but was not well-
known until the emergence of cryptocurrencies [7].   
 
There are two primary types of distributed ledger networks: public and permissioned [31]. 
Which approach is best depends on the application scenario.2 In public (permissionless) 
blockchain systems such as Bitcoin, anyone can join the network, so all nodes are treated as 
potential attackers. Producing a reliable consensus involves significant performance overhead. 
Permissioned blockchains limit participation to identified users. While this restriction simplifies 
security and governance, it could make it easier for one or a small number of participants to 
exercise control.  
 
Table 1 summarizes key characteristics of blockchain-based distributed ledgers. 
 
Benefit Description 
Decentralization No trusted party or intermediary is needed to validate transactions. Users 
control their own data. 
Transparency The history of transactions and the software algorithms governing the 
blockchain network are typically public for anyone to review. 
Immutability It is extremely difficult to change data recorded on a blockchain. 
Availability Blockchain ledgers are replicated among many nodes, making them highly 
available even if some nodes become inaccessible. 
Security All entries in the ledger are cryptographically secured. All transactions are 
digitally signed, and access is through public/private cryptographic key pairs. 
Table 1. Characteristics of a blockchain 
 
III. BLOCKCHAINS FOR SPECTRUM SHARING  
 
As a general-purpose database-type technology, blockchain can in theory be applied to virtually 
any business context. However, the potential benefits of distributed ledgers come with costs. 
Blockchain technology is not the best solution for every scenario. The first step in assessing the 
usefulness of blockchain is to ask whether its features — decentralization, transparency, 
immutability, availability, and security — are relevant for the application at hand. The World 
Economic Forum suggests a similar approach [39]. If all relevant data are to remain under the 
control of a single trusted party, for example, there is no need for a decentralized solution.  The 
FCC table of spectrum frequency allocations [12] published on a blockchain would be no better 
than the document published in the Federal Register. 
 
                                                             
2 For purposes of this paper we differentiate the two general categories, although there are many gradations and 
hybrids of public and permissioned blockchains under development. 
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From this high-level perspective, spectrum sharing seems like a promising candidate for 
blockchain technology, as shown in Table 2.  
 
Benefit Potential Application to Spectrum Sharing 
Decentralization Eliminate the need for trusted third parties such as spectrum licensees, 
band managers, and database/SAS administrators.  
Transparency Better localized visibility into spectrum usage; auditability of activity for 
effective implementation of spectrum sharing rules.  
Immutability Permanent records prevent tampering, facilitate accurate 
auditing/enforcement, and can ensure accurate implementation of rules. 
Availability More reliable accessibility of spectrum sharing databases. 
Security As communications infrastructure, wireless systems need strong security 
against attacks. Secure ledgers also foster reliable enforcement of 
sharing regimes. 
Table 2. Blockchain characteristics applied to spectrum sharing 
 
In contrast with traditional exclusive frequency allocations, spectrum sharing by definition 
involves multiple entities with rights to use the spectrum. Management mechanisms using 
databases are being employed for spectrum sharing regimes such as TV White spaces (TVWS) 
and the Citizens Band Radio Service (CBRS). Since blockchains are a form of database, it is worth 
exploring whether they could be used to enhance the effectiveness of various forms of 
spectrum sharing. 
 
Information about access rights and usage can be recorded on a distributed ledger, and 
managed using smart contracts.  Distributed ledgers offer benefits compared to centralized 
databases for tracking property rights and assets which could make them effective tools for 
spectrum management. Some of the benefits we foresee are: 
- Increased speed in the evaluation of available spectrum resources (in a given area) and 
registering spectrum use without incurring the processing delay of an authorization 
from a regulator. Service operators participating in a blockchain for spectrum 
management interactions (e.g., sharing and trading) could check their own local copy of 
the distributed ledger to decide what spectrum resources to use. 
- Regulators can use the information in the distributed ledger for evaluating spectrum 
access efficiency, computing fees for spectrum use, and enforcing spectrum access 
regimes.  
- With the use of smart contracts, dynamic and rule-based spectrum use interactions can 
be tracked and enabled such as: changing the fees for the use of spectrum based on 
time of day, automatic transfer and reconciliation of spectrum use fees, facilitation of 
spectrum trading interactions between service providers.  
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As a more concrete example, DiPascale et al propose a smart contract system for providers of 
“small cell as a service” to implement service level agreements (SLAs) for mobile network 
operators in localized areas [12]. This use case could in theory be implemented either on 
licensed spectrum or through unlicensed frequencies using a mechanism such as LSA to provide 
quality of service guarantees. The authors focus on how the smart contract could automate the 
processes of payment and enforcement of the SLA, making it easier for individuals or other 
small-scale antenna operators to implement these arrangements with operators.  
 
Table 3 offers a high-level comparison of public and permissioned blockchain-based approaches 
to the primary spectrum management approaches in use today. 
 
There are a number of issues that would need to be considered to implement blockchain-based 
spectrum sharing. Mobile devices would likely not have the processing power and battery 
capacity to operate as full blockchain nodes, but fixed devices might, depending on the 
consensus protocol used.  
 
One additional issue is that unless limited to nodes that have a wired network connection, the 
distributed ledger would likely also use spectrum resources for the communications needed to 
validate transactions. This could create capacity issues, especially if the blockchain uses 
broadcast communications among nodes, as Bitcoin does. High-performance distributed 
permissioned ledgers may have significantly lesser communications requirements, because 
nodes are trusted [31]. In addition, the inherent unreliability of wireless communication, which 
is magnified in a primary non-cooperative sharing environment, will likely require adaptation of 
blockchain protocols in the same way that wireless communications devices must incorporate 
greater error correction and buffering than wired ones.  
 
There are a various other practical implementation questions that we only address here in a 
cursory way, such as who would operate and govern the blockchain networks, how they would 
be funded, and how they would be deployed. Because the effects of wireless transmissions are 
localized, a blockchain would need to have sufficiently dense information to be useful. 
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 Technical Benefits Business Benefits Limitations 
FCC exclusive 
licensing 
Clear boundaries 
between allocations 
Receivers can be 
inexpensive 
Auctions get spectrum to 
those who value it most, 
and raise revenue  
Licensees have 
confidence about rights 
Limited flexibility  
Fails to maximize 
spectrum utilization 
Potential for licensee 
spectrum hoarding 
Unlicensed Encourages innovation 
Devices improve with 
hardware and software 
Permissionless entry 
Device purchases replace 
recurring service charges 
No guaranteed 
transmission quality 
Potential for “tragedy of 
the commons” 
No ability to protect 
primary users 
3rd Party DB/SAS Allows both guarantees 
for primary users and 
open access 
Mandatory rules provide 
certainty compared to 
unlicensed 
Added capacity without 
new auctions/clearing 
Allows heightened 
protection/override for 
government uses 
Flexibility for market 
participants 
Database provider 
controls data 
Need to convince 
incumbents of value 
proposition 
Accuracy of database 
records not guaranteed 
Public         
blockchain 
Transparent ledger for 
spectrum management 
and auditing 
Strong security 
High availability  
Users control data 
Facilitates spectrum 
access fees 
Complex arrangements 
via smart contracts 
Cryptocurrencies can 
incentivize cost-based 
activities 
Significant overhead of 
consensus protocols 
Uncertain governance 
Anonymity of users could 
pose enforcement 
challenges 
Permissioned 
blockchain 
High performance 
Defined governance rules 
Transparent ledger for 
spectrum management 
and auditing 
Strong security 
High availability  
Users control data 
Facilitates spectrum 
access fees 
Complex arrangements 
via smart contracts 
Questionable benefits 
relative to traditional 
databases 
Require identification of 
network participants 
Table 3. Benefits and limitations of spectrum sharing mechanisms 
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IV. APPLICATION TO SPECIFIC FORMS OF SPECTRUM SHARING  
 
There are many ways in which researchers have proposed sharing spectrum.  Each approach 
makes different assumptions and may have different functional requirements to support it.  
Even if blockchain technology is useful for spectrum sharing generally, its value may depend on 
matching implementation details with sharing scenarios. However, we propose that it is not 
necessary, at this point anyway, to consider the functional requirements for each spectrum 
sharing scheme that has been proposed and that it is sufficient to consider classes of 
approaches. 
 
 Non-
Cooperative 
Cooperative 
Primary Unlicensed Secondary Markets 
Secondary Opportunistic Cooperative Sharing 
Table 4. Modes of spectrum sharing 
 
To this end, we consider the typology for spectrum sharing proposed by Weiss and Lehr in [35], 
reproduced in Table 4 as a guide for this discussion. It should be noted that there are 
approaches and technologies that arguably fall between the categories listed, so these four 
categories are best seen as archetypical with the possibility that some forms of sharing do not 
neatly fit into any one of these categories.   
 
The term "primary sharing" in Table 4 means that all users have equivalent (or equal) rights to 
access the spectrum, as is the case, for example, in the unlicensed bands.  In contrast, a 
secondary sharing regime implies a hierarchy of rights, where incumbents/primary 
users/license holders have superior rights to spectrum entrants/secondary users. TV white 
spaces and the Citizen’s Broadband Radio Service (CBRS) as well as Licensed Shared Access 
(LSA) are examples of this kind of rights relationship.  Much of the research in spectrum sharing 
assumes a secondary sharing regime.  In the table, “cooperative” sharing means that ex ante 
agreements have been struck between the sharing parties regarding sharing.  Secondary 
markets that involve voluntary exchange can be thought of as cooperative sharing, as sharing 
techniques such as LSA.  Finally, in non-cooperative sharing, users do not coordinate their use 
ex ante.   
 
It is important to keep context in mind when applying a simple framework such as the one in 
Table 4.  For example, while TVWS can be seen as a form of cooperative secondary sharing 
when the relationship between the class of secondary users and the class of primary users is 
considered, sharing among secondary users may be non-cooperative.  Similarly, sharing 
between primary users in this case is cooperative (through the licensing process) and primary.   
 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3141910 
 
 
We will use this framework to explore if and how blockchain technology might be applied for 
spectrum sharing.  
 
A. Primary non-cooperative sharing 
In this kind of sharing, users do not coordinate their usage of the spectrum in advance and they 
have equal (or equivalent) rights to transmit and receive. The most straight-forward example of 
this type of sharing would be the open access spectrum sharing as typified by the unlicensed 
ISM bands (even though some uses of these bands implement cooperation in their medium 
access protocols).  There are two sub-categories of primary non-cooperative sharing: 
 
1. Open Access Commons: In open access commons, any spectrum user that meets the 
technical requirements of the band may operate. No user is guaranteed any additional 
protection against interference. In such an environment: 
o Spectrum users must be able to find stations to communicate with (whether base 
stations or other mobile users in an ad hoc network) 
o Spectrum users need to be able to detect and deal with other stations who are 
transmitting and who may or may not be "polite".  This is, in part, what MAC protocols 
do.  
2. Private Commons: In a private commons, access may be governed, meaning that an 
additional function will be determining who gets to use the spectrum and when (as 
suggested in [34]).  For private commons, additional functions come into play: 
o Spectrum users must have a way of managing the commons and allowing and 
disallowing access (i.e., exercising collective action rights as described in [31]); 
o Spectrum users must have a way of determining others' usage for enforcement 
purposes. 
 
The success of WiFi in the ISM bands shows that databases are not necessary for effective 
primary non-cooperative sharing, at least in some usage contexts. However, they might 
improve the efficiency of spectrum utilization in such environments or facilitate business 
models such as mesh networks that have been widely explored by researchers but slow to 
develop commercially. In a rapidly changing communications environment, spectrum use will 
change as mobile devices alter their location and fixed devices go in and out of service. Each 
spectrum user will only need to know about its local environment at any given moment to 
determine the availability of spectrum resources. All spectrum use data recorded on a 
blockchain can be timestamped and geocoded, either by the device itself or the node in the 
blockchain network that first recorded the information. Based on this information, devices or 
network controllers could develop a near real-time map of the local spectrum environment 
depending on the latency of the blockchain to attain consensus on the validity of recorded 
spectrum use entries. Such information could be used to decide whether to admit new users to 
a private commons.   
 
In essence, blockchain would be used to keep a dynamic record of the users operating in the 
band. However, having each device register its location on the blockchain would generate 
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significant overhead. The practical question is whether the benefits in terms of spectrum re-use 
and improved device performance would exceed the costs. 
 
Open access commons might lend themselves more to public blockchain networks, because 
they are open to anyone. Spectrum users in an open access environment are untrusted. Users 
cannot assume that other users (or more precisely, MAC layers of their devices) will be polite. 
On the other hand, blockchains for this category of spectrum sharing are likely to handle a 
relatively high volume of transactions. If the blockchain is dynamically recording all users of a 
band as they operate and move, it will need scalable real-time processing capacity. This tends 
to be more difficult on public blockchains, because they use complex consensus mechanisms in 
place of trusted identity of participants.  
 
Furthermore, on an open access commons, no particular protocol is required of devices, so 
participation in a blockchain-assisted system would not be guaranteed. Users or devices would 
need sufficient incentives to contribute to, and check with prior to transmission, a blockchain 
distributed ledger. A related question is who would be willing to operate the nodes of such a 
network. One answer might be to use a cryptocurrency. Device operators could pay to 
participate in a blockchain-mediated real-time tracking system that would improve 
performance, and node operators would be compensated for maintain and verifying 
transactions on the ledger. 
 
Finally, a blockchain could aid regulators in assessing activity, and in pursuing enforcement 
against users who violate the transmission standards for the band.  However, it is unclear 
whether sufficient information would be stored in the blockchain to support an enforcement 
action. 
  
Most of the same benefits of blockchain for open access commons would apply to the private 
commons scenario. In the case of a private commons, a permissioned blockchain would be a 
good fit, because all users must be identified in order to access the spectrum.  There might be 
efficiencies of having the operator of the commons also manage the blockchain, although a 
third party could handle it too. The operator could use the blockchain to manage individual 
devices efficiently, or to develop longer-term analytics about the spectral environment.  
 
In a private commons, compliance with coordination standards is required by the commons 
manager. Therefore, enforcement is not just a matter of baseline requirements set by 
regulators, but of the specific terms set for the private commons. Because every device would 
have to register and be identified, smart contracts could be used to establish payment 
mechanisms from devices to the commons manager. They could also operate as a “kill switch” 
for devices that fail to meet applicable requirements.  
 
The following table summarizes the benefits, drawbacks and characteristics of using a 
blockchain that keeps a record of the wireless users operating in a primary non-cooperative 
sharing environment 
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Primary non-cooperative Sharing 
Open Access Commons Private Commons 
Benefits(+) and drawbacks(-) 
(+) Enhanced spectrum use efficiency 
(+) Near real-time map of local spectrum use can 
be built 
(+) Blockchain can be used to confirm presence of 
a node and verify its identity 
(-) Overhead to run the blockchain, no reward 
incentive for nodes to maintain the blockchain 
(+) Enhanced spectrum use efficiency 
(+) Near real-time map of local spectrum use can 
be built 
(+) Blockchain facilitates the enforcement of 
spectrum access rights 
Blockchain type to use 
Public blockchain. However, likely infeasible due 
to the overhead and network structure needed to 
operate it.  
Permissioned blockchain 
Table 5. Benefits and drawbacks of blockchains for primary non-cooperative spectrum sharing 
 
B. Primary cooperative sharing 
In primary, cooperative sharing, users coordinate their uses ex ante. The best example of this 
might be the (as yet hypothetical) real time spectrum markets, as studied by [7] [33]. The 
functions that this kind of sharing implies are: 
• Spectrum users need to be able to find transmission opportunities that map to their 
needs 
• Spectrum users need to be able to exchange usage rights rapidly 
 
Many aspects of blockchains for primary cooperative sharing will be similar to primary non-
cooperative environments. When used to identify stations to communicate with or to 
supplement sensing of the local environment, a ledger in a cooperative environment would 
have similar properties to those described in the previous section. The major difference is that 
in cooperative sharing, uses are coordinated and rights are allocated before transmission 
occurs. The primary function of a distributed ledger in an environment of real-time spectrum 
markets would be to record and enforce market transactions.  
 
For TVWS and the 3.5 GHz SAS, databases essentially memorialize a fixed set of rights: two-tier 
secondary sharing rules for the case of TVWS, and three-tier SAS based operations for 3.5 GHz. 
Secondary or lower tier users must query the database to protect the primary users. In the case 
of primary cooperative sharing, a database would serve a slightly different purpose. Because all 
users are primary, no one can transmit without first obtaining transmission rights. On the other 
hand, those with transmission rights need not account for others.  
 
A ledger for primary cooperative sharing must therefore be able to record transactions for 
transmission rights where additional logic could use the records in enforcing those rights 
among devices. Spectrum access coordination and maintenance of the ledger could be 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3141910 
 
 
performed by a modified SAS or a band manager [7]. The band manager would read requests 
for spectrum entered on the blockchain by the nodes from entities that want to operate in a 
given location. The requests would specify the spectrum requirements of the node (i.e. 
bandwidth, central frequency, location, time, etc.). The band manager proceeds to determine if 
the request can be satisfied and proceeds to record a spectrum assignment in the blockchain 
that the requesting node can afterwards read and enable. For a real time spectrum trading 
market operation such as that described in [7] the band manager would instead become a 
spectrum exchange that would record requests and offers of spectrum and perform the 
exchange of transmission rights via smart contracts.  
 
Different types of contracts and their related spectrum trades could be enabled. As an example, 
in a time limited spectrum use trade, when the contract terminates or the rights-holder 
negotiates a new agreement, the blockchain can be used to enforce the new allocation of 
transmission authorizations.  The flexibility of smart contracts would allow for transactions of 
arbitrary levels of sophistication. For example, a spectrum rights-holder might grant another 
user transmission rights limited by time, geography, transmission characteristics, or 
throughput. Transactions could be contingent on verification of payment, or verification that 
devices are compliant with transmission protocols.  
 
For many instances, the use of smart contracts on spectrum management blockchains will 
require access to external information to execute the logic of the contract.  Smart contracts can 
reference information outside the blockchain in two ways. They can incorporate oracles, which 
are automated systems that verify information (such as a stock price on a given date) [4]. Or 
they can incorporate human arbitrators. Most blockchain-based systems, including Bitcoin, 
support a feature called multisig, in which the approval of transactions require the submission 
of M out of N cryptographically signed approval messages (most commonly 2 out of 3) [24]. If 
each party to a transaction has one signature key and a neutral arbitrator has the third, the 
arbitrator's decision can bind the parties and activate the enforcement mechanism of the smart 
contract. A smart contract for primary cooperative spectrum sharing might, for example, 
require a user to submit to verification that its devices meet certain criteria by a third-party 
firm, which would control the private signing key needed to enforce the smart contract.  
 
In addition to the flexibility and automation of smart contracts, blockchains for primary 
cooperative sharing could also provide a transparent, auditable, unified record of transactions. 
This would provide the same benefits in the spectrum sharing context as blockchains in other 
industries. For example, having a single shared ledger means that each spectrum user doesn't 
have to maintain its own database, verify that its records accord with its counterparties, and/or 
trust the accuracy of a central clearinghouse. The fact that the government or a monopoly 
private contractor would not be needed to operate the transaction clearinghouse could address 
concerns about biases and excessive charges that have arisen in analogous contexts such as 
telephone numbering administration and internet domain name registration.  With a 
blockchain, each party controls its own data, but everyone is able to see the entire ledger. 
Assuming the ledger is transparent, market participants as well as regulators can perform 
audits and observe market trends. Regulators could also use the blockchain to tax transactions 
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as a funding mechanism. If transactions are considered competitively strategic, a permissioned 
ledger could be made non-transparent, or could only be viewed by the regulator. 
  
Blockchains for the primary cooperative sharing category would require less transaction 
throughput than the real-time spectrum map described in the previous section. They would 
only be recording explicit transactions between spectrum rightsholders, rather than tracking 
the activity of every device. In a real-time spectrum marketplace, the volume of transactions 
would not be trivial, and the system would have to update its state quickly enough for devices 
to receive accurate information. However, blockchain operations introduce latency in 
registering transactions, in particular because of block latency which is incurred by nodes in the 
blockchain having to wait for enough requests and/or assignment transactions to have been 
issued before a block can be built and deemed a candidate to be incorporated in the blockchain 
and submitted to the consensus algorithm used in a particular blockchain implementation. 
Thus, only near-to-real time operations can be enabled, but if the block size to speed tradeoff is 
carefully balanced, a spectrum marketplace using a blockchain could be feasible, although 
research is still needed to be certain.  
 
Blockchain use in Primary Cooperative Sharing 
Benefits (+) and drawbacks (-) 
(+) Enables spectrum trading markets 
(+) Enables different types of spectrum trading transactions with the use of smart contracts 
(+) Provides an auditable, unified record of transactions 
(-) True real-time spectrum market is not feasible due to latency in the blockchain. A near-real-time 
market could be feasible but needs to be carefully designed. 
Blockchain type to use 
Public or permissioned blockchain could be used. However, a permissioned blockchain would be 
simpler to manage, faster, and can better protect transaction information that could be used for 
competitive purposes. The regulator would need to have access to the blockchain to guarantee fair 
market operation.  
Table 6. Benefits and drawbacks of blockchains for primary cooperative spectrum sharing 
 
C. Secondary non-cooperative sharing 
Secondary, non-cooperative sharing is the opportunistic sharing case typified by cognitive radios 
[15], where secondary users do not coordinate their usage in advance with primary users.  This 
approach has been widely studied.  Functions implied by this kind of sharing include: 
• Determination of where transmission is possible (spectrum hole detection) 
• Determination of other opportunistic users who are using the same band 
• Detection of when transmission is no longer possible 
 
There have also been proposals, such as the Cognitive Pilot Channel (CPC) [29], that enable a 
degree of cooperation between the incumbent (primary user) and the entrant (secondary user). 
A blockchain could be used as a secure implementation of this channel, providing a history of 
incumbent interventions to the community. Basically, the CPC would provide information to 
radio terminals so that they can decide how to (opportunistically) use spectrum. The 
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information could include, a list of available frequency bands and which primary operators are 
active at a given time and space. This history is useful for entrants to determine their risk [9].  
TVWS could also be seen as a kind of hybrid, since coordination with the primary is cooperative 
while sharing available channels is opportunistic. 
 
The most prominent uses of blockchains for secondary non-cooperative sharing would likely be 
to enhance the ability of opportunistic devices to identify transmission opportunities, and to 
automate the process of auditing and enforcement for those opportunistic users. As with 
primary non-cooperative sharing, even if unlicensed devices are not required to follow a 
particular protocol, they would benefit from richer information about primary users. The 
decentralization, availability, and security of blockchain distributed ledgers could be an 
improvement over the centralized databases in existing systems such as TVWS. They might 
allow for systems analogous to TVWS where the primary users’ transmitters are not fixed, or 
their transmission patterns are more complex than television broadcasting.  
 
The ultimate question here is whether an opportunistic/non-cooperative environment lends 
itself to the use of some feature(s) of blockchain.  Does non-cooperation means not using 
blockchain services?  We see that from a binary (yes/no) perspective it might seem that a 
noncooperating device would not use blockchain services, but there is no need to assume such 
strict categories and it is likely that there are many shades of gray to consider in terms of these 
definitions of cooperative and non-cooperative.  Maybe there is a model for having a “non-
cooperative” environment where devices participate in a blockchain for spectrum sharing to 
acquire environmental input, or possibly simply participate because the spectrum policy 
mandates participation for reasons of producing a log of activities for any potential 
enforcement review that might arise. 
 
Smart contracts could further enhance such a system. They could be used to implement geo-
specific transmission masks to limit the ability of secondary devices to interfere with primary 
users, while leaving them the flexibility to transmit when, where, and how they choose. 
If primary users experience interference, a blockchain-based ledger recording the activities of 
secondary devices could be used to assess violations, or even impose penalties through smart 
contracts.  
 
One of the challenges with the current TVWS system is that some primary users provide 
inaccurate information that artificially reduces the scope for secondary users [25]. While a 
blockchain verifies consistency of information on a distributed basis, it does not necessarily 
solve this problem. The blockchain itself has no way to determine if the information provided 
by authorized users is truthful. Once information is added to the blockchain, it cannot easily be 
tampered with, but garbage in is still garbage out.  
 
Additional verification and identity/reputation layers could theoretically be built on top of the 
ledger to deal with this "fake news" problem. There is widespread experimentation with “token 
curated registries” [15] and other mechanisms that employ the economic incentive structures 
of cryptocurrencies and the immutable recording of blockchains to improve information 
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quality.  In essence, these approaches make it profitable to be truthful and unprofitable to be 
untruthful, so long as a majority of users are honest. Further study is required to evaluate 
whether such solutions might be useful for spectrum access ledgers. 
 
Blockchain use in Secondary non-Cooperative Sharing 
Benefits (+) and drawbacks (-) 
(+) Provides a record of primary user operations against which opportunistic access operations can be 
executed  
(-) Additional overhead and little differentiation with non-Cooperative access approaches for 
secondary users such as those used for TVWS. 
Blockchain type to use 
Public or permissioned blockchain could be used. As discussed above, there are questions as to what 
defines a non-cooperative device and how this device might interact with blockchain services.   
Table 7. Benefits and drawbacks of blockchains for secondary non-cooperative spectrum sharing 
 
 
D. Secondary cooperative sharing 
In secondary cooperative sharing, users coordinate their use ex ante. Mobile Virtual Network 
Operators (MVNOs) behave in this way, but so do users under the License Shared Access (LSA) 
regime or the Citizen’s Band Radio Service (CBRS) recently proposed by the FCC. Also, this mode 
of sharing might also be useful to describe users of a commercial mobile service, where the 
usage is controlled through the access system (e.g., HSPA, LTE). 
 
Secondary cooperative sharing is likely a rich domain for blockchain implementation. Most of 
the discussion in Section B about blockchains and smart contracts for primary cooperative 
sharing would also apply to the secondary model. The major difference is the greater variety of 
transactions possible in a secondary cooperative sharing environment. Rightsholders are not 
simply transacting to give all or nothing primary rights to other parties. They can subdivide their 
rights under any set of arrangements they choose.  
 
The issue of who operates the blockchain may also have a different resolution in this category. 
There need not be one blockchain for the entire band. An incumbent, for example, might 
operate a private blockchain to manage its MVNOs or its implementation of LSA. The 
blockchain could coordinate among secondary users subsidiary to that incumbent, but wouldn't 
necessarily affect others.  
 
There are a few applications in particular to consider in this spectrum sharing category: 
• Registration/authorization of devices: Base stations of a radio access network provider 
that dynamically allow devices associated with previously authorized entities to use the 
base station resources. It is possible to imagine this association to occur via a smart 
contract, which would result in a blockchain implementation 
• Spectrum Access Systems (SAS) can be seen as an approach to the governance of shared 
spectrum [34]. WinnForum has identified some information sharing principles that apply 
particularly to sharing information between SASs. It is possible that blockchain based 
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systems can support these design goals naturally. Especially those related to CBSD 
registration data captured by a SAS and that will need to be shared with regulators and 
other SAS entities.  
 
In the particular case of blockchain supported SAS operations. A distributed ledger would be 
useful in SAS to SAS interactions that aim at maintaining a unified view of the devices registered 
for CBRS operation in a particular region (or set of regions) where two or more SASs may be 
offering spectrum access services. Similarly, the interactions between the operators of ESC 
(Environmental Sensing Capability) devices and SAS operators could be secured and managed in 
a blockchain based distributed ledger. 
 
 …. 
 
Blockchain use in Secondary Cooperative Sharing 
Benefits (+) and drawbacks (-) 
(+) Enables secure, distributed handling of spectrum usage rights 
(+) Enables different types of secondary spectrum use transactions with the use of smart contracts 
(+) Provides an auditable, unified record of transactions 
(-) Latency in blockchain operation would limit the rate at which new spectrum use transactions can 
be validated 
Blockchain type to use 
Public or permissioned blockchain could be used. However, a permissioned blockchain would be 
simpler to manage, faster, and can better protect transaction information that could be used for 
competitive purposes. The regulator would need to have access to the blockchain to guarantee fair 
market operation and efficient use of spectrum resources.  
Table 8. Benefits and drawbacks of blockchains for secondary cooperative spectrum sharing 
 
 
V. Implications for stakeholders 
A blockchain-based spectrum management model could have a broad set of implications for 
different entities in the spectrum ecosystem.  Here we briefly consider several of the major 
stakeholder in this space. 
 
Incumbents 
Incumbent holders of spectrum might view blockchain as a negative if it ushers in the sharing of 
their current exclusively held spectrum. Such sharing might increase concerns over interference 
issues, but more significant it might result in decrease value to exclusively held spectrum.  On 
the other hand, there might be blockchain models that the incumbents use as a coordination 
tool for their users, or possibly to coordinate leasing of a given band. We generally believe 
incumbents will be more concerned about the potential increase in sharing, loss of control, and 
negative impact on spectrum values, than in the opportunities to improve management of the 
spectrum they control.  
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Entrants 
New entrants would likely have the most to gain if blockchain-based spectrum management 
was adopted. It could allow for easier, more coordinated access to spectrum and enable access 
to shared (possibly free or low cost) spectrum.  As mentioned above, it is possible that 
spectrum could be accessed in some form of coordinated leasing or new unlicensed models, 
lowering the high bar often associated with obtaining adequate spectrum. Cryptocurrencies 
could support new economic arrangement involving micropayments and automated smart 
contracts, which might foster broader and better-quality access on an unlicensed foundation. 
 
Spectrum Managers 
The blockchain model poses a direct threat to spectrum management functions, such as 
database operator or band managers.  In blockchain systems, many of the functions performed 
by these entities would be implemented in a decentralized model that does not have a 
significant role for them.    
 
Policymakers 
The implications of blockchain on spectrum management are probably biggest on policymakers 
and spectrum regulators.  While this approach could enable new access and new business 
models, relieving demand by improving access, it could also lessen the current command and 
control model of spectrum management in a way that some regulators would be unwilling to 
consider.  Blockchain might also have a negative impact on spectrum revenues if it allows for 
easier and cheaper access to what has been managed as a scarce resource.  
 
One of the more interesting applications could be blockchain as a tool for coordination 
between governments.  For example, blockchain could be employed as a management layer 
when US troops are using spectrum during times of friendly occupancy (a major issue for DoD). 
Lastly, it is worth noting that blockchain could be part of a more involved process of policing for 
interference events.  Here, a log would exist indicating who was using bands at what time/place 
and this could help in resolving interference events.  Of course, it isn’t clear that blockchain 
would be needed for such monitoring, but it would provide some useful attributes for such a 
process.  
 
International Implications 
At an international level, it is unclear just how this would play out.  It could be that agreements 
would be put in place to allow blockchain as an enabler of cross border access to spectrum.  It 
could be that blockchain be used as a monitoring (accounting) tool in certain bands or used as a 
tool for coordination during times of joint use of spectrum.  The biggest concern is that this 
approach might raise sovereignty issues by disintermediating the power and role of the 
national regulator by differing to a distributed permissionless approach.  Each nation state 
could decide whether blockchain-connected devices would be allowed to operate in its 
territory. However, because blockchains are decentralized (especially public blockchains), it 
might not be easy for a government to prohibit operation of the blockchain itself to record 
information for spectrum-sharing applications. 
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VI. CONCLUSIONS 
This paper takes a broad look at the application of blockchain to spectrum sharing. We 
demonstrate that a number of areas are worth of deeper research. It is too early to declare 
with confidence that blockchain will be superior to conventional database technology, or even 
that useful blockchain-mediated spectrum sharing is technically feasible. However, the primary 
benefits of blockchain-based distributed ledgers—decentralization, transparency, immutability, 
availability, and security—are all well-suited to spectrum sharing. By drilling down into four 
modes of spectrum sharing, we have identified a number of scenarios for productive 
implementation of blockchain technology.  
 
As situations suitable for blockchain-based approaches in the spectrum sharing universe are 
identified, some additional questions arise that require further research. From a technical 
perspective, the question is whether blockchain performs “better” than alternate 
implementations. In this analysis, it would be critical to identify the correct objective function; 
it would be one thing to compare two systems based on technical requirements and quite 
another if socio-technical goals were to be considered.  
 
There are also several general challenges for blockchain technology that remain to be resolved. 
Major public blockchains such as Bitcoin and Ethereum use a consensus mechanism, proof of 
work, that requires massive energy expenditures by the miners who compete to verify 
transactions. Alternatives such as proof of stake do not yet have a track record of operating 
securely at scale. Scalability, governance, and interoperability are major challenges for all 
blockchain system, especially public blockchains. A number of solutions are under active 
development, such as new consensus algorithms and “layer 2” solutions that rely on the 
blockchain for security but are not limited to its performance characteristics. Cryptocurrencies 
tend to be extremely volatile, and attack both scams and theft. While these may not directly 
affect blockchain systems designed for applications such as spectrum sharing, a major 
cryptocurrency crash could have negative fallout on development activity and adoption.  
 
Permissioned blockchains, on the other hand, need to demonstrate that they offer significant 
differentiation from traditional approaches. If a database-driven system such as an advanced 
SAS is not being deployed today, for whatever reasons, it is not obvious that a permissioned 
blockchain would cause a different result. And there are many different consensus mechanisms 
and network configurations under the permissioned blockchain heading, just as for public 
blockchains. A fragmented situation in which different groups push for their preferred solution 
could eliminate potential benefits of a universal shared ledger. Finally, deployment and 
operation of blockchain networks and the associated decentralized applications and smart 
contracts is not costless. There would need to be economic models, whether through internal 
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cryptocurrencies or external funding, to support deployment of the systems described in this 
paper. 
 
Blockchain is an ideology as much as it is a technical approach. Further work is needed to assess 
how consistent this ideology is with spectrum sharing, or rather, when it is. From an initial 
observation, the emphasis on decentralized coordination that animates blockchain 
communities seems like a strong fit for spectrum sharing. Given the high level of development 
activity and interest in blockchain technology today, and the continued need for enhanced 
spectrum access and utilization methods, blockchain approaches to spectrum sharing deserve 
further investigation. 
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APPENDIX A: BLOCKCHAIN TECHNOLOGY  
 
Blockchain takes advantage of cryptographic methods to guarantee both trust and reliability of 
data. All data entries to the blockchain are digitally signed. As the name suggests, data is stored 
in chains of blocks, each of which incorporates a cryptographic hash function linking it to the 
prior block. Each new block of transactions is appended to the end of the chain. The nodes that 
participate on the distributed ledger network broadcast transactions to each other and validate 
each new block as it is added. 
 
Strictly speaking, not all distributed ledger platforms use the blockchain data structure. R3’s 
Corda platform, for example, combines a blockchain-type consensus mechanism with a 
traditional relational database for information storage. Following the standard usage, we 
employ the term “blockchain” for immutable distributed ledgers that use a consensus algorithm 
so that no entity has control over transaction validation. 
 
As a classic example of a permissionless distributed ledger, Bitcoin uses randomized selection to 
achieve consensus, backed by an approach called proof of work [1] [23].  Proof of work is 
designed to make attacks costly for the attackers to subvert the voting-based consensus 
process.  In proof of work, “miners” authenticate blocks by competing repeatedly amongst each 
other to solve a computationally difficult mathematical puzzle that is related to the information 
contained in the block. The greater the miner's processing power, the greater the chance of 
finding the solution and winning. If a miner solves the mathematical puzzle, the miner 
broadcasts the block of the digital actions to all the nodes of the network to be approved. All 
the other nodes in the network check the block and if a majority of nodes agree, that block of 
digital-actions is added to the blockchain. The "winning" miner for each block receives Bitcoin 
as a reward. Proof of work makes attacks costly, because a dishonest node is competing against 
the total processing power of the network [36]. Because each block is linked to the previous 
ones, it becomes more and more difficult to falsify a block as time goes on.  
 
Not all blockchains use proof of work. It requires immense computing power and its associated 
electricity. Although Bitcoin's proof of work system has worked successfully for since 2009 as 
the currency went from zero to an aggregate value of over $120 billion at mid-2018 exchange 
rates, concerns about potential vulnerabilities and misbehavior by miners remain. Proof of 
stake, which avoids the need for mining and its colossal waste of energy, is being actively 
explored as the future consensus mechanism for Ethereum, the second most valuable public 
blockchain [20] [36]. Table A describes the characteristics of a few consensus protocols.  
 
Permissioned blockchains can use more lightweight consensus protocols. In these networks, 
only authenticated parties can process transactions. The network may be open to anyone 
meeting specified criteria, or it may be limited to a private consortium. Either way, because 
nodes are known, they can more easily be trusted. A variety of permissioned blockchains such 
as Ripple, Stellar, Hyperledger, Symbiont, and R3 Corda use consensus mechanisms based 
around voting processes among nodes [20] [21]. This can typically be done far more quickly 
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than proof of work or proof of stake, making it easier to scale permissioned blockchain 
networks for high transaction volume applications. On the other hand, permissioned 
blockchains do not offer the same level of decentralization as public systems.  
 
 
Voting Tool Advantages Disadvantages Resources  Model 
Proof-of-Work 
(PoW)  
• Decentralized 
control 
• Power and 
process 
consumption 
Solving the 
mathematical 
puzzle→ 
processor 
power→ 
energy 
consumption 
Bitcoin 
Proof-of-Stake 
(PoS) 
• Decentralized 
control 
• Low latency  
• Ease of rule 
• Lack of 
flexible trust 
Certificate of 
Deposit 
NXT (Registry, 
asset 
exchange, 
secure 
messaging, 
and stake 
allocation) 
Stellar 
Consensus 
Protocol (SCP) 
• Decentralized 
control 
• Low latency 
• Flexible trust 
• Manual 
broadcasting 
for the root 
token 
  
Quorum vote 
(peer 
standing) 
Vumi (Under 
development) 
Ripple 
Consensus 
Protocol 
• Decentralized 
control  
• Network 
monitoring 
Exceptional 
node list 
based on 
peer 
reputation  
Ripple 
Table A: Several consensus approaches (adapted from [20]) 
 
 
 
 
